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(iii) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), inasmuch as this case was transferred to the Court 
of Appeals from the Supreme Court. This appeal is from an Order Granting Motion 
for Summary Judgment of the State of Utah and the Memorandum Decision Pursuant 
to Rule 52(a) entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah on February 8, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. If an injured party (Aundrae Higley via his estate inasmuch as he is a 
minor) does not file a claim or commence an action against any third party for 
compensation for injury sustained, but rather if the insurance company voluntarily 
comes forward and offers Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to the injured party 
and his conservator; and further, if none of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
was paid to the injured party as recovery of medical costs, in fact, the limit of 
medical costs coverage under the insurance policy, i.e., Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00), was paid directly to medical care providers, whereas the Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) was recovery for personal and emotional injury suffered 
by the injured party, then in such a situation has the injured party "filed a claim" or 
"commenced an action" against a third party "for recovery of medical costs" for the 
injury to allow the State of Utah reimbursement for Medicaid assistance under Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 26-19-7?. 
(iv) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Aundrae Higley, a minor, was seriously injured in an accident and underwent 
extensive medical treatment. The automobile involved in the accident was insured 
by Farmers Insurance Group.1 The liability policy provided a Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($20,000.00) limit of liability for non-medical personal injury damages and 
provided a Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical expense cap. 
At a point later in time the Higleys applied for Medicaid assistance whereby 
the State of Utah paid Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighteen and 99/100 
Dollars ($54,918.99) toward medical expenses. 
Farmers paid the aforementioned Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) directly to 
Aundrae's medical care providers and the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) was 
paid to Aundrae via his estate. That settlement was approved by the Third District 
Court. 
Thereafter, the State of Utah petitioned the lower court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 26-19-7, for reimbursement of the entire Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) paid by Farmers, 
The lower court entertained cross motions for summary judgment and after oral 
argument granted the State's motion and entered an Order Granting Motion for 
Summary Judgment of the State of Utah and a Memorandum Decision Pursuant to 
Rule 52(a). 
1
 Hereinafter Farmers. 
1 
The estate of Aundrae Higley has herein appealed that decision of the lower 
court. In accordance thereto the following statement of facts are relevant to the issues 
presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 30, 1985, Aundrae Higley,2 then twelve (12) years of age, was 
seriously injured when the parked car on which he had been sitting pulled away 
from the curb at a high rate of speed, causing Aundrae to fall and strike his head 
on the pavement. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 108) 
2. As a result of the accident, Aundrae underwent extensive medical 
treatment, the cost of which exceeded Sixty Five Thousand Dollars ($65,000.00). 
Aundrae twice underwent brain surgery and intensive therapy. (See Affidavit of 
Dennis J. Higley, record at 109) 
3. Aundrae sustained permanent brain damage and, at a minimum, 
sustained a twenty five percent (25%) disability as a result of the injuries sustained 
in the accident. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 109) 
4. The automobile involved in the accident was insured by Farmers. (See 
Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 109) 
5. The policy of liability insurance provided limits of coverage of Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) for injuries to one person per occurrence and a Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) coverage limit on medical payments. (See Affidavit of 
Dennis J. Higley, record at 109) 
2
 Hereinafter Aundrae. 
2 
6. While in the hospital Aundrae's father, Dennis Higley, was approached 
by representatives of Farmers who informed him that the Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) in medical benefits coverage would be paid to the medical care providers 
and that Farmers had decided to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) policy 
limit to Aundrae to partially compensate him for the physical and emotional injuries 
he suffered as a result of the accident. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley, record at 
109) 
7. Farmers offered Dennis Higley the aforementioned settlement on or 
before May 31, 1985. (See Response of Estate of Aundrae Higley to State's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, record at 164) 
8. The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on medical benefits 
from Farmers was paid to the medical care providers. (See Affidavit of Dennis J. 
Higley, record at 109) 
9. Dennis Higley applied for Medicaid assistance on or about June 10, 1985. 
(See Motion for Summary Judgment, record at 148) 
10. Eligibility for Medicaid assistance was certified by the Department of 
Social Services on or about June 20, 1985. (See Motion for Summary Judgment, 
record at 150) 
11. The State of Utah paid a total of Fifty Four Thousand Nine Hundred 
Eighteen and 99/100 Dollars ($54,918.99) in Medicaid benefits for the medical services 
and treatment rendered to Aundrae. (See Notice of Petition and Hearing, record at 
80) 
3 
12. Dennis Higley, without the assistance of legal counsel, petitioned the 
lower court for appointment as conservator of the estate of Aundrae Higley,3 Aundrae 
being a minor. (See Petition for Appointment of Conservator, Approval of Settlement 
and Authority' to Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record at 2 - 50) 
13. Dennis Higley was appointed conservator of the estate of Aundrae 
Higley on or about October 30, 1985. (See Minute Entry Dated Oct. 30, 1985, record 
at 52) A formal order was entered by the lower court on or about November 22, 
1985. (See Amended Order Appointing Conservator, Approving Settlement of Minor's 
Claim and Authorizing Conservator to Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record 
at 63 - 67) 
14. A lower court found that the aforementioned Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) offered settlement was in full and final settlement of all claims and was 
in addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in medical benefits which 
Farmers had already paid or would pay. (See Amended Order Appointing 
Conservator, Approving Settlement of Minor's Claim and Authorizing Conservator to 
Invest Proceeds and Execute Release, record at 65) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is not a difficult case. Indeed the framework of surrounding issues 
has been carved out by pre-existing case law. 
The State simply is not able to afford itself the reimbursement relief provided 
for in U.C.A., Section 26-19-7(2). The facts clearly show that the Estate of Aundrae 
Higley did nothing to trigger the State's cause of action in this case. Farmers settled 
3
 Indeed the actual Petition was drafted by the attorneys for Farmers. (See 
record, at 2) 
4 
with the Estate of Aundrae Higley prior to the State providing or becoming obligated 
to provide medical assistance. More importantly, in light of this Courf s disposition 
to perhaps apply the existing medicaid statute retroactively, no part of the Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) received by Aundrae was a recovery of "medical costs". 
ARGUMENT 
I. Medicaid Has No Statutory Right To Recover From 
Aundrae Higley. 
The State's right to recover Medicaid payments made on behalf of Aundrae 
Higley should be governed by Utah Code Annotated,4 Section 26-19-7, as that section 
existed in 1985, when Aundrae's injury occurred, a settlement took place, and the 
State provided certain Medicaid payments on his behalf. That section, at that time, 
provided as follows: 
A recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against a third 
party for recovery of medical costs, for an injury, disease, or disability 
for which the department has provided or has become obligated to 
provide medical assistance without the department's written consent.5 
Nonetheless it is conceded that in 1989, that section was amended. The existing 
language that prohibited the filing of a claim without the State's consent now 
includes the settlement, compromise, release, or waiver of a claim as well. That 
section now reads as follows: 
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery 
of medical costs, for an injury, disease, or disability for which the 
4
 Hereinafter U.CA. 
5
 Emphasis added. 
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department has provided or has become obligated to provide medical 
assistance without the department's written consent.6 
It is inappropriate, however, to apply the current section retroactively. And, 
therefore, applying the only facts available to the lower court, it is clear that the 
State's right to recover has not been triggered in this case.7 Neither Aundrae nor his 
parents filed a claim or commenced an action against a third party for recovery. 
Indeed, Farmers agreed to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) to Aundrae 
before the State provided or had become obligated to provide medical assistance and 
that settlement was only formalized by way of court approval after that application 
had been made. Further, no part of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
received by Aundrae was a recovery of "medical costs". 
A. U.GA. Section 26-19-7 Should Not Be Applied Retroactively. 
This honorable Court has already concluded that the legislature merely 
intended to clarify the statute with its 1989 amendments.8 However the Supreme 
Court of this state has respectfully stated that the well established general rule is that 
statutes not expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively.9 
There is of course a relatively narrow exception where a statute changes only 
procedural law by providing a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing 
6
 Emphasis added. 
7
 It is only after a recipient proceeds in violation of the statute that the state's 
right to recover is triggered. See U.C.A., Section 26-19-7(2). 
8
 See Camp v. Office of Recovery Services, 779 P.2d 242, 246 n.2 (Utah App. 
1989), hereinafter Camp. 
9
 In Re LP., 648 P. 2d 1364, 1369 n.4, (1982), and authorities cited. 
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substantive rights.10 Further the general rule has no application where the later 
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or amplification as to how the law 
should have been understood prior to its enactment.11 
In the case at hand, the 1989 amendments to the Medicaid statute alter the 
substantive law of that statute In the past the law was triggered only if a claim was 
filed or an action commenced. Now, any settlement triggers the statute. 
Because of the serious consequences the Medical Benefits Recovery Act has 
on near indigent citizens of this state, its terms should be strictly construed and the 
State should only be allowed to recover when it meets the burden of proving a 
violation of the Act.12 Applying the statute as it existed at the crucial times of this 
lawsuit, it is clear that the State's right to recover was never triggered. 
B, The Higleys Did Not File A Claim Or Commence An Action 
Against Farmers. 
The State's right to recover is triggered only if the recipient "file[s] a claim or 
commence[s] an action against a third party." The undisputed facts show that the 
Higleys did not file a claim or commence an action. Rather, Farmers7 agents 
approached the Higleys while Aundrae was still hospitalized, informed the Higleys 
that they were paying the medical bills up to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) 
10
 In the Matter of the Disconnection of Certain Territory from Highland City, 668 
P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983), citing Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 
Utah, 663 P. 2d 450 (1983). See also State Department of Social Services v. 
Higgs, Utah, 656 P. 2d 998 (1982). 
11
 In the Matter of the Disconnection of Certain territory from Highland City, 668 
P. 2d 544, 548 (Utah 1983), citing Okland Construction Co., v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 520 P.2d 208, 210 - 11 (1974). 
12
 See Indiana v. Guardianship of McEntire, 471 N.E. 2d 6, 9 (Ind. App. 1984). 
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policy limits on medical, and would pay the policy's Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) general limits to Aundrae. No claim was ever filed and no action was 
ever commenced by the Higleys against a third party. 
C Farmers Agreed To Pay The Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000,00) To Aundrae Before Medicaid Had Paid Or Became 
Obligated To Pay Medical Costs On Behalf Of Aundrae. 
As shown by the letter from Farmers to the Higleys,13 Farmers had paid the 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical limits and agreed to pay the Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) general limits to Aundrae sometime prior to May 31, 
1985. Application for the State's assistance was not made until June 10, 1985, and 
was not accepted by Medicaid until June 20, 1985. Though Farmers' settlement 
hadn't received court approval until later, it was nonetheless agreed to prior to any 
request for the State's assistance. 
Though it was touched on briefly in a footnote, Camp involved a fact scenario 
wherein the recipient had filed a claim prior to seeking Medicaid assistance. 
The State's right to recover is limited to cases where a claim is filed or an 
action commenced against a third party after the State has paid, or become obligated 
to pay, medical expenses. This conclusion is mandated not only by the clear 
language of the Act, but also by the dictates of common sense. Indeed, this Court 
in Camp expressly held: 
. . . [C]ourts are not free to disregard the plain meaning of statutory 
language . . .. Nor may we interpret unambiguous language in the 
statute itself so as to contradict its plain meaning.14 
13
 See record at 163 - 4. A copy of the same is attached hereto as Exhibit A and 
incorporated herein for the Court's convenience. 
14
 Camp at 245. 
8 
Obviously, If the State has made no payments there is no reason to get consent. 
There is nothing to consent to. Because Farmers agreed to pay Aundrae before the 
State entered the picture, the Higleys cannot have been required to seek the State's 
consent to Higley's receipt of the money. 
D. The Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000,00) Received By Aundrae 
Higley Was Not A Recovery Of "Medical Costs." 
Farmers paid the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) medical cost limits of the 
policy directly to medical care providers.15 The Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
paid by Farmers to Aundrae was to compensate him for the physical and emotional 
injuries he suffered as a result of the accident.16 That evidence was uncontradicted 
in the lower court proceedings. 
Indeed at the lower court level portions of the Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley 
were read into the record. The court asked specifically if there had been a motion 
to strike the affidavit to which the State responded that there had not.17 Ergo, the 
only evidence in the record shows clearly that the settlement was to compensate 
Aundrae for the physical and emotional injuries he suffered. 
This further illustrates the lower court's error in finding to the contrary that 
the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery included reimbursement for 
15
 See Exhibit A. 
16
 See record at 108 - 131. A copy of the Affidavit of Dennis J. Higley is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated herein for the Court's 
convenience. 
17
 See record at 256 - ?. A copy of the germane portion of that transcript is 
attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein for the Court's 
convenience. 
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medical expenses in addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in no-fault 
medical benefits. The only evidence before the lower court was Mr. Higley's 
aforementioned Affidavit. 
The State attempted to dispute that fact by noting that the release documents 
prepared by Farmers7 lawyers released all of Aundrae's claims including claims for 
medical costs. That cannot be surprising, however, given the fact that Farmers had 
paid or was going to pay the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on 
medical costs. Further, in the Amended Order Appointing Conservator, Approving 
Settlement of Minor's Claim, and Authorizing Conservator to Invest Proceeds and 
Execute Release18 it was determined as follows: 
Robert Mott, Rita Mott and Curtis Okerland, Jr., through their insurance 
carrier, Farmers Insurance Exchange, have offered the sum of $20,000.00 
in full atnd final settlement of all claims which Dennis J. Higley or 
Aundrae Higley may have as a result of the accident specified herein. 
This amount is in addition to $5,000.00 in medical benefits which 
Farmers Insurance Exchange has already paid or will pay to or on behalf 
of Aundrae Higley.19 
There really is no dispute that only the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) was 
paid by Farmers as "medical costs". That amount was not paid to the Higleys but 
directly to the medical care providers, reducing the amount ultimately paid by 
Medicaid. 
The fact that no part of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) settlement 
was reimbursement for "medical costs" is the one issue that wasn't resolved in Camp. 
18
 See record at 63 - 67. 
19
 Emphasis added. 
10 
In Camp this Court stated that an insurance adjuster had submitted an affidavit 
which contained a statement that the settlement was for all legally recoverable 
damages, including medical expenses.20 
In the case at hand since it is undisputed that the Twenty Thousand Dollars 
($20,000.00) received by Aundrae was in addition to the amount paid by Farmers for 
medical costs, the State is not entitled to any portion of that. 
E. Even Under Scrutiny Of U.GA. Section 26-19-7 As It Now 
Reads, The Statute Simply Has Not Been Triggered. 
While in the hospital Aundrae's father, Dennis Higley, was approached 
by representatives of Farmers who informed him that the Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000.00) in medical benefits coverage would be paid to the medical care providers 
and that Farmers had decided to pay the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) 
policy limit to Aundrae to partially compensate him for the physical and emotional 
injuries he suffered as a result of the accident. Farmers offered Mr. Higley the 
aforementioned settlement on or before May 31, 1985. 
Mr. Higley applied for Medicaid assistance on or about June 10, 1985. 
Eligibility for Medicaid assistance was certified by the Department of Social Services 
on or about June 20, 1985. 
The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) policy limits on medical benefits from 
the Farmers was paid directly to the medical care providers. 
Therefore, even under the present language of the statute, the actual settlement 
was agreed upon before Mr. Higley sought assistance from the State. 
Camp, at 246. Emphasis added. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The Higleys took no action that would trigger the State's right to recover any 
portion of the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) settlement from Farmers. No 
claim was filed, no action commenced, no settlement effected after Medicaid entered 
the picture. More importantly, the Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery 
was void of any medical costs component. The record is clear and uncontroverted 
as to that. 
This Court is therefore respectfully asked to reverse the lower court's decision 
in granting the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case with 
instructions to enter findings consistent with the evidence on record, i.e., the Twenty 
Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) recovery was for pain and suffering and was in 
addition to the Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) paid for medical benefits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / £ day of ^ ^ u . r r - , 19 ?o . 
fetor Lawpence 
'Attorney/for Aundrae Higley and 
ite of Aundrae Higley 
12 
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EXHIBIT A 
Blake S. Atkin #4466 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for the Estate of Aundrae Higley 
and Aundrae Higley, a minor. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
AUNDRAE HIGLEY, 
A Minor. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS 
J. HIGLEY 
Probate No. P-85-1091 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dennis J. Higley, having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. Attached to this Affidavit is a true and correct 
copy of a letter I received from Farmers Insurance Group on or 
about the date it bears. 
DATED thisy?/2/fS V dav of^February, 1989. 
7i2*^_<t^J» 
DENNIS"J. HIGJrfEY ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this'^LaJ?. day of 
February, 1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake 
T H E 
Farmers Insurance Group O F C O M P A N I E S 
May 31, 1985 SALT LAKE CITY SOUTH BRANCH CLAIMS 
P. O. BOX 7700 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-0700 
Phone: 566-7131 
Mr. & Mrs. Dennis Higley 
1527 W. Claybourne Ave., 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Re: Our Insured: 
Policy No: 
Loss Date: 
Claimant: 
Robert Mott 
76 10745 48 72 
4-30-85 
Aundrae Higley 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Higley, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange offers policy limits to your son, Aundrae 
Higley, for the accident of April 30, 1985. 
We are in the process of paying $5,000 limits in medicals and offer 
$20,000 to Aundrae as per our agreement. 
Per our conversation at the hospital, I am sending the file to our 
Attorneys who will prepare the Court Approval Settlement. They will 
be in touch with you shortly. 
If you have any questions, please contact me. 
Very truly yours, 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
V?9^ 
MARINA PERKINS 
Claims Representative 
MP:ej 
EXHIBIT B 
RLEDBISTHSGTC89RT 
Third Judicial District 
Blake S. At kin #44 f- h 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
50 South Main Street/ Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 By, 
Attorneys for the Estate of Aundrae Higley 
and Aundrae Higley, a minor. 
UNI "I'l IF HI IWi DISTRICT COURT IN \NI) FOU SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: J 
AUNDRAE HIGLEY, ] 
A Minor. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 
\ DENNIS J. HIGLEY 
> Probate No. P-85-1091 
State of Utah ) 
Count y o f S.m It Lake ) 
Dennis J Higley, having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the matters set 
forth herein. 
2 . My w j f H S h i r 1. e y Ll 11•' H i »"| I '•j y \' 111 I < »' I h '• p d i e n t s 
and guardians of Aundrae Higley. 
3. Aundrae was born on Septembp 
4. Aundrae, Shirley and'I are residents of Salt Lake 
County, Sta:e of Utah. 
i I 11 i »11'i' 11, i "n« W»>11 I f' 1 <i y t1<)u r r1i» rt / e 11 u e , 
Was- ,.-; ill, Aundrae Higley was seriously injured 
whef-t ine parked car m whirh he had been sitting pullea jway 
f inli Mill f spppti Mjusimj Aundrae fo S \ 
JAN 1 9 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Doputy ClerT 
and s t r i k e h i s head on the pavement. 
6 . The dr ive r of t; he c a r was Cu r t i s Oker 1 and, J i . 
7 . "'""in ! i ",i " ikei l a n d , J i 'kru:!w t h a i AIJIHJ n.ie w a s 
sitting on the car when Okerland accelerated. 
3 The car being driven by Curtis OkerMnri li , VJ.-IS, 
owned by Robert Mott, Rita Mott and Curtis Okerland, Ji and 
was insured by Farmers Insurance Group. 
9. As I'l result: I I he iiccii'leiil , A11rn 11 rie underwHiil 
extensive medical treatment, the cost of which exceeded 
$65,00( Aundrae twice underwent brain surgery and intensive 
oindrae's treating physician i Dr, Marion L. 
Walker, neu - .* - - • s Medical <'*••*r11 
According Walker, the prognosis roi Aundrae is thai he 
will have difficulty with coordination and fine motor control 
.••--. :lv on. hi s ] eft hand 1 eft arm,, and 
left leg. Aundrae has permanent br ai i i damage and r^ - minimum 
Aundrae has Mistainnd H " I'ercent d i •: ab L 1 I ty
 t\ , d re^ul* I 
the injuries sustained in the acident with Curtis Okerlund, 
Jr. A copy of Dr. Walker•s. evaluation is attached as Exhibit 
1,1. At the time of the accident the car driven by 
Curtis Okerland, . J. . was ins, z iinei :> ins 
Exchange. The policy of liability insurance provided limits of 
coverage of $20,000 for :i njuries to one person per occurrence 
ai id a $5 , 00 0 • ::o verage lii nit • :>i I medi ca] payments . 
-2-
12. While at Primary Children's Medical Center 
visiting Aundrae, I was approached by representatives of 
Fanners Insur din »• Exchange who intormed me that they had 
insured Mr. Okerland's car, that that insurance policy was the 
only asset nf the1" MnttT in Mr nke ?• I a rnrt -ininl Midi I h<-» $l , DfMl in 
medical benefits coverage would be paid to Primary Children's 
Medical Center and that Farmers Insurance Exchange had decided 
f (J IH'T'I' Lin .I „, . lib ti.i M u n d r a e t o p a r t i a l l y 
compensate him : ^ physical and emotional injuries he 
suffered as a result of accident. 
13. The $5,000 poll cy limits on. medical benefits from 
the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy was paid to Primary 
r li  ] d r e 11 '"' i, M e cil :i c a 1 C e n t e i:.. 
14 Never at any time did Aundrae, Shirley Ann Higley 
: I £i le a claim or commence an action against Farmers 
si iranee Exchange. 
15. Shortly after Aundrae1s release from Primary 
r:i ] dren' s Merino 1 f Hint HI I I Ihjrney'i I ",| IK-Jirmei \i hibin din t 
Exchange filed in the Thi !" Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, * petition r appointment of 
iKservdlm J i | J | n '. HI I If -- . .*rir-trr J a u t h o r i t y to i n v e s t 
proceeds and execute r e l e a s e . 
1 6 . A u n d r a e , Sh i r l e v rmr i ^MI> I eprpspint" nd my 
counsel ^ those proceedings. transcript ut the hearing in 
that ;:-dttei is attached as Exhibit "B". 
-3-
Despite my requests for information, neither the 
Court nor counsel for Farmers Insurance Exchange told me that 
t h e s t a t e w o u l d iiMkfj H r 1 HI I in in t.' - " "ll " " fjiust 1 u ir i < J u n l e s s 
they were first notified and consented -: the settlement. 
DATED this /fi~fa dav of ^nuarv 1989 
Subscribed and sworn 
January, 1989. 
My JZoxtimission E x p i r e s : 
>* P£ 
* 
J . HIGL£? 7 S? ~*^ 
.re me t h i s day u£ 
C 
/ 
^ 
Residing in / J?if- Ad As (22*f CCrztJ-
KM 
i<P 
WENDY KING 
W3o.IWn,3u*»12M 
UTM144 
s or 
_ 4 _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this \% day of January , 1989,, 1 hereby certify 
thdl I (.Mused I ii he in a i led - postage, prepai J. d l.iue and correct 
copy ot the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J. HIGLEY to the 
following: 
Douglas Springmeyer 
Assistant Attorney General! 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Aundrae Higley 
Dennis J. Higley 
1527 West Claybourne Avenue 
West Valley City# Utah 84119 
3168b 
-5-
mm PRIMARY CHILDREN'S 
MM MEDICAL CENTER 
DIVISION OF PEDIATRIC NEUROSURGERY 
320 Twelfth Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)521-1209 
MARION L WALKER, M.D.. F.A.C.S., F.A.A.P. 
Chairman, Division of Pediatric Neurosurgery 
May 15,1987 
JESSE C. TRENTADUE 
BERMAN & O'RORKE 
50 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SUITE 1250 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84144 
Re: Aundrae Higiey 
158916 
Dear Mr. Trentadue: 
As you are aware, Aundrae Higiey is my patient. I first saw him on May 1, 1985 after he was 
involved in an automobile accident. He had been injured the day prior to his arrival at the Primary 
Children's Medical Center. He worsened during the night and was transferred to our facility 
because of the development of a blood clot overlying the left posterior portion of his brain in the 
epidural space. This blood clot was immediately beneath the bone and external to the dura which 
is the covering over the brain. He had a skull fracture at that site also. This is undoubtedly the area 
that he struck when he fell off of the car that he had been sitting on the day prior to his admission 
to our hospital. 
In addition to the extradural hematoma and the skull fracture, he sustained a bruise of the left 
cerebellar hemisphere. Approximately three days following his surgery for the extradural 
hematoma, this bruise began to bleed and he developed a large blood clot involving the 
substance of the left cerebellar hemisphere. This required a second surgical procedure and 
severely injured his brain. This greatly complicated his hospital course and resulted in the need 
for prolonged rehabilitation as well as a lengthened hospital stay. 
Aundrae Higiey is left with permanent brain damage as a result of these injuries. He will always 
have difficulty with coordination and fine motor control on his left side. This will be most noticed in 
his hand but will be present in his arm and leg on the left side. It will also affect his balance and 
coordination when he is running or participating in athletic events or activities that require good 
coordination and fine motor control. 
Aundrae also has the risk of seizures. The development of seizures during the course of his 
hospital stay is a result of the injury to his brain. Although he is currently not having seizures, that 
risk exists for his future. His risk of having seizures is approximately 4 to 5 percent. If seizures 
occur, he will require medication and occasional evaluation with EEG and/or other diagnostic 
modalities. 
I have great concern that Aundrae will develop a signifcant learning disability. The nature of his 
injuries would predispose him to this disability. Only formal neuropsychological testing would be 
able to document the extent of the problems that exist. 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
Associate Professor of Surgery 
Division of Neurosuraerv 
Associate Professor of Pediatrics 
Department of Pediatrics 
May 15,1987 
Re: Aundrae Higley 
Page 2 
Because of the difficulties with coordination, balance and fine motor movements, and because of 
the possibility of seizures and learning disabilities, Aundrae should have a disability of at least 25 
percent of the whole man. It is possible that his disability is greater than this, 
I hope this information is helpful to you. Please don't hesitate to contact me if you require further 
information. 
Sincerely yours, 
Marion L Walker, M.D., F.A.C.S., F.A.A.P. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTJR 1 L'M COUP11 ill- .HU.I 1. >i I 
STATE OF UTAH 
* A k 
.11 INT 1 
In tinii mal t e r 
of the Estate of 
AUNDRAE HIGLEY, 
a minor. 
Probate No P8 C -in<U 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
October 30, 1985 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above-enti t ,11 ed cat is * i 
•^cxiutr regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy 
r. Hanson, - Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of 
..i K. r Dunty, 
State of Utah on the 20th day of October, 1985, at 
1:30 p.m., and that the following pi: oceedings we:-- : . 
* "nil it 
\SN -<V 
Bunny Neuenschwander, CSR, RPR, CP 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
1i 
13 
1* 
15 
1 
1 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
For Farmers Insurance 
Excuange: 
Aldrea C. Alcabes 
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON 
& CHIPMAN 
1300 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake.City, Utah 84101 
* k * 
IU 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
October 30, 1985 
1:30 p.m. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect the Court's in 
session in the matter of the Estate of Auncirae H igle,, ,„ d 
minor, Probate No. P85-1091. 
Before the Court s a petition '- * \: e appointment 
ettlement, 
authority to invest proceeds, and execute releases The 
record should reflect that the * •*.;.=. 
you- And also the minor's parents, also the petitioner, 
Dennis J. Higley And i assume you're Shirley Ann Higley; 
is tin "it' correct ? 
MS. HIGLEY: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: The record wri ] 3 • t:ef 1 e< : : t 
acceptance of service of the petition, and consent t 
appointment of conservator, and waiver of notice : hearing 
h a s l:ii"ep «e i "eiHi hi / I h»' C u m '  <nd e x e c u t e d :J> V - Higley. 
That ;.s your signature, is it not, on that document? 
MS. HIGLEY: Yes. 
COURT: A I I right. We f11 f i1e that Di d you 
22 • just want to have Mr Higley sworn? 
23 I MS, ALi!'ABES i 11 n . hem 
24 I sworn. 
25 
i£ 
u^ 
21 
3 
DENNIS J. AND SHIRLEY ANN HIGLEY, 
called as witnesses, having been first duly sworn, 
were examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MS. ALCABES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. ALCABES: 
Q Mr. Higley, would you state your name and your 
address for the record? 
A Dennis Higley, 1527 West Claybourne Avenue. 
Q Mr. Higley, are you the nature father of Aundrae 
Higley? 
A Yes. 
Q How old is Aundrae? 
A He just turned 13. 
Q Is it true that on April 30th of 1985 Aundrae was 
injured when he was sitting on a car that pulled away from 
the curb, pulled away and he fell off the car; is that 
correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q Was that car driven by either Robert Mott, Rita 
Mott, or Curtis Okerland, Jr.? 
A It was owned by one of them. 
Q Owned or driven by one of them? 
A Yeah. 
4 
Q As a result of that accident, is it correct that 
Aundrae sustained injuries to his head and his brain? 
A Yes. 
Q And as a result of his injuries, has Aundrae 
incurred medical bills that exceed $65,000? 
A Yeah. They exceed that for sure. 
Q Is it true that—is Aundrae currently undergoing 
medical care for his injuries? 
A Hefs got therapy, and he's under medication too. 
Q So he sees a therapist regularly? 
A Twice a week now. 
Q Will Aundrae have some sort of permanent 
disability as a result of the accident? 
A They said—well, they don't know how much. A 
percentage, but they donft know how much. 
Q What are some of the things that Aundrae is not 
able to do now? 
A It's his coordination. A lot of it has come back, 
but he staggers, and when he's writing and stuff, his 
balance— 
MS. HIGLEY: He can't write very good. 
Q (By Ms. Alcabes) How long was Aundrae in the 
hospital? 
A A little over two and a half months. 
Q Mr. Higley, have you reached some kind of a 
5 
settlement with Mott's insurance carrier? 
A Yeah. 
Q Is that settlement to pay you—to pay Aundrae 
$20,000 in addition to the $5,000 in medical bills? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know that that's the limits of the 
insurance policy? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you satisfied yourself that the Motts don't 
have any other property from which to satisfy a judgment? 
A Yeah. 
Q Do you understand that I'm not your attorney; that 
I'm the attorney for Farmers Insurance Group, the Motts' 
carrier? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Do you understand that you have the right to talk 
to an attorney before you enter into this settlement? 
A Yes. 
Q Have you talked to an attorney? 
A Yes. 
Q Who did you talk to? 
A There was one—I don't know what his name was, and 
then another one was Robert DeBry. I talked to him on the 
phone, and checked in, and he told me that that was the 
maximum the policy was worth. 
6 
Q In light of what you know about the policy limits, 
and the extent of the Motts1 assets, do you want to enter 
into this settlement? 
A Well, as I say, they ainft got nothing. I donft 
think they will have anything more than they got. Hefs had 
open-heart surgery and everything else, and they ain't got 
no money. 
Q You1re talking about the people that are 
responsible for Aundraefs injuries? 
A Yeah. Anyway, as far as I know, they ainft got 
nothing. 
Q So in light of what you know, do you want to enter 
into this settlement? 
A I don't know what you mean. 
Q Do you want to take this $20,000? 
A Yeah. 
Q Do you understand that by taking this $20,000, and 
entering into this settlement, that neither you nor your 
wife, nor Aundrae will ever be able to sue the Motts, or 
this stepson, Curtis Okerland, Jr.? 
A Right. 
Q Do you understand what you1re to do with.the money 
you're given from the insurance company? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q What are you supposed to do with it? 
7 
A It goes into an account for Aundrae. When he's 
18, he can draw that out* 
Q Do you understand thatfs to be a federally-insured 
account? 
A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
Q Do you desire that your wife serve as Aundraefs 
successor/conservator in the event that something happens 
to you, and you are no longer able to serve as his 
conservator? 
A Yes. 
MS. ALCABES: May I ask Mrs. Higley some 
questions? 
Q Mrs. Higley, do you desire to be appointed the 
successor/conservator in the event that something happens 
to your husband? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that because of the need for continuing medical 
care for Aundrae, and the need for continuity? 
A Yes. 
MS. ALCABES: Do you have any other questions? 
THE COURT: Just a couple. Who has been, and who 
will be paying the medical bills in the future? 
MR. HIGLEY: Medicaid picked up the balance after 
the $5,000 from the insurance company. Medicaid picked up 
the rest. 
8 
THE COURT: Is there any arrangements as to who's 
going to be paying medical bills in the future, assuming 
there are some? 
MR. HIGLEY: Me, I guess. 
MS. ALCABES: I think you have a question for the 
judge in relation to that. 
THE COURT: Is there something you wanted to ask 
me, Mr. Higley? I'll be more than happy to try and answer 
it. 
MR. HIGLEY: What I was wondering, like this money 
goes into a deal for him. Medicaid can't come back and 
take that money from him where the bill is against me? 
THE COURT: Probably not. But it would depend 
upon the particular statutory authority that Congress has 
given whoever runs Medicaid, assuming it's the Department 
of Health and Welfare, or whatever it's called. That 
involves federal statutes, and federal law, Mr. Higley, and 
this Court doesn't deal with federal law—only state law. 
I would advise you that generally insurance companies who 
pay medical bills have an interest in proceeds that might 
be received like this, but where the expenses far outweigh 
any recovery, and obviously if there is liability.here, the 
only reason you're taking this $20,000 is that's all there 
is. The claim would be worth substantially more if there 
is liability. 
9 
MR. HIGLEY: The bill is close to probably 
$95,000. 
THE COURT: Frankly, I doubt that they are going 
to come back and bother you. But I can't guarantee it. I 
don't pretend to have any control over the federal 
government. 
MR. HIGLEY: I don't know. But I've heard where 
it's actually his money, not mine, they can't make him pay 
my debts. 
THE COURT: Should someone assert a claim against 
the funds that you're going to be holding for your son as 
conservator, it is his money. That's true. It's not your 
money. It's his. If in fact that's the case, what you 
need to do is contact an attorney so you can have your 
rights explained to you. 
MR. HIGLEY: Nobody said anything about it. 
Medicaid doesn't even know we are getting it, as far as I 
know, 
THE COURT: I suspect that they'll never make any 
claim. If they do you'll need to contact an attorney. 
MR. HIGLEY: Another thing I was wondering, is 
this tax free? 
THE COURT: As far as your son is concerned? 
MR. HIGLEY: Yes. 
THE COURT: As I understand the tax laws, I don't 
10 
pretend to be a tax lawyer— 
MR. HIGLEY: When he reaches 18, when he takes it 
out— 
THE COURT: Personal injury judgments are 
generally not taxable, 
MR. HIGLEY: What about the interest on it? 
THE COURT: The interest is taxable. 
MS. HIGLEY: Thank you. 
THE COURT: That's my best guess at this point in 
time. And I donft pretend to be a tax lawyer. I've just 
been in this business for a while, and have learned that. 
So the tax laws change every five minutes, so who knows. 
MR. HIGLEY: He wouldn't have to pay no tax on the 
interest until he drawed it out? 
THE COURT: He wouldn't have to pay yearly. In 
any event, you can talk to your accountant about that, or 
Whoever does your taxes. Who do you have do your taxes? 
MS. HIGLEY: H & R Block. 
THE COURT: They can answer that question. Ifm 
not a tax expert by any matter or means. It's your son's 
income, and it will be so small it will probably not be 
taxable even if the thing is taxable. But the thing to do 
is to talk to H & R Block. All right. The Court finds 
that the minor is in need of a conservator. There are 
funds that would become available to Aundrae as a result of 
11 
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1
 this injury. While it appears that his injuries and 
2
 damages far exceed the amount that•s being paid in this 
3
 J matter, the Court also recognizes, and is satisfied that a 
reasonable inquiry has been made by the parties into the 
5
 ability of the potential liable parties, that is the 
6
 insureds of Farmers Insurance Exchange in this matter is 
7
 that they would not be able to satisfy any judgment above 
8 and beyond the policy limits in any event. This proposed 
9 settlement is the maximum policy limits available. And the 
10 Court% s satisfied. 
1! Therefore, Ifm going to appoint Mr. Higley as 
12 conservator to act without bond on the Estate of Aundrae 
13 Higley with all the rights and responsibilities that run to 
14 a conservator. The funds will be required to be placed in 
15 a federally-insured account not to be withdrawn absent 
16 order of the Court. In Paragraph 14A, you address the 
17 question of the proof of medical bills as an authorization 
18 to take funds from the account. I really don't have any 
19 difficulty with that, but I want to make sure that all 
20 other possibilities of payment on medical bills that might 
21 be incurred in the future are exhausted before you can get 
22 to these funds. In other words, it would be nice if when 
23 Aundrae is 18 that he has the corpus, or the $20,000 plus 
24 the interest available to him, because he's probably going 
25 to need it. 
12 
1 So obviously, if bills come up that you can't 
2 afford to pay, and there is no insurance, and there is no 
3 place else to go except this, I understand that. And 
4
 Medicaid will pay as well. And Medicaid will say, well, 
5 there fs an estate there, we are not going to pay any more 
6 until that's gone. So in any event, it's the intent of the 
7 Court, and I have no problem with approving the petition in 
8 the manner as suggested, but Mr. Higley, I would suggest to 
9 you and your wife to utilize all sources to pay the bills 
to before you get to Aundrae's money, because as he gets 
ti older, he's going to need it, particularly if he continues 
I 
12 to have the problems that he is now experiencing. 
13 And finally, I'll require some indication from the 
H institution that they understand the contents of the order. 
15 MS. ALCABES: Does the Court want to make any 
16 changes in the order with regard to the intent that the 
17 money be used? Will the Court also approve Mrs. Higley as 
18 the successor/conservator? 
19 THE COURT: Yes. That's approved as well. I 
20 didn't mean to overlook Mrs. Higley. 
21 MR* HIGLEY: Now, we put this money in the bank. 
22 We can put it in a certificate or money market, or anything 
23 that we get the best interest on? 
24 THE COURT: The best interest, so long as it's a 
25 federally-insured account. 
13 
MR. HIGLEY: It can be in a three or five-year, 
then renewed? 
THE COURT: Best interest you can get in a 
federally-insured bank under any plan, as long as it's 
safe. It has to be a safe investment. 
The record will show I've reviewed the proposed 
order, and it is in a satisfactory format, and I've 
executed it. There you go. 
MS. ALCABES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(The hearing is concluded at 
this time.) 
* * * 
1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
3I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
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16 
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19 . 
BUNNY C^ROL NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR, CP 
21 
22 
23 
24 I My Commission Expires: 
25 December 5, 1987 
I, BUNNY CAROL NEUENSCHWANDER, do hereby certify: 
That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License 
No. 152, and one of the official court reporters of the 
State of Utah; that on the 30th day of October, 1985, I 
attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the 
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said 
shorthand proceedings to be transcribed into typewriting, 
and the foregoing pages, numbered from 3 to 14, inclusive, 
constitute a full, true and correct account of the same to 
the best of my ability. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this ^?j ^ N i a y of 
March, 1987. 
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EXHIBIT C 
1 MR. ATKIN: 1 HAVE COURTESY COPIES. 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: NO, 1 HAVE COPIES OF THEM IN 
3 THE FILE IF YOU WANT TO REFER TO A SPECIFIC AFFIDAVIT 
4 AND HAVE ME READ THE LANGUAGE. 
5 MR. ATKIN: IF I MIGHT APPROACH THE BENCH? 
6 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU MAY. 
7 MR. ATKIN: 1 AM READING FROM PAGE 3 OF THE 
8 AFFIDAVIT IN PARAGRAPH 12. MR. HIGLEY STATES THAT "WHILE 
9 AT PRIMARY CHILDREN'S MEDICAL CENTER VISITING AUNDRAE, 
10 I WAS APPROACHED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF FARMERS INSURANCE 
11 EXCHANGE WHO INFORMED ME THAT THEY HAD INSURED MR. OKERLUND'S 
12 CAR, THAT THAT INSURANCE POLICY WAS THE ONLY ASSET OF 
13 THE MOTTS OR MR. OKERLUND AND THAT THE $5,000.00 IN MEDICAL 
14 BENEFITS COVERAGE WOULD BE PAID TO PRIMARY CHILDREN'S 
15 MEDICAL CENTER AND THAT FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE HAD 
16 DECIDED TO PAY THE $20,000.00 POLICY LIMITS TO AUNDRAE 
H TO PARTIALLY COMPENSATE HIM FOR THE PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
1* INJURIES HE SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT." 
19 MR. SPR1NGMEYER: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY INTERJECT. 
20 I DON'T BELIEVE THIS IS A PROPER MATTER FOR THIS AFFIDAVIT. 
21 IT IS CLEARLY IN THE NATURE OF HEARSAY AND IT'S NOT PERSONAL 
22 KNOWLEDGE OF MR. HIGLEY. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: HAS THERE BEEN, MR. SPRINGMEYER, 
2 4
 A MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT? 
25
 M R. SPRINGMEYER: THERE HAS NOT. 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 26-19-2 
tion (4)(a).; added "and" to the end of Subsec-
tion (4Kb); added Subsection (4)(c); made punc-
tuation changes throughout Subsection (4); 
and added Subsection (5). 
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 
1990, substituted "Human" for "Social" in Sub-
section (3). 
Social Securii^ A c t — Title XIX of the fed-
eral Social Security Act is compiled as 42 
U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. Sectfcn/1919 of Title XIX 
is 42 U.S.C. § 1396r. <V/>\V ;> 
^ 
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CHAPTER 19 
MEDICAL BENEFITS RECOVERY ACT 
Section 
26-19-2. 
26-19-5. 
26-19-7. 
Definitions. 
Recovery of medical assistance 
from third party liable for pay-
ment — Lien — Notice — Ac-
tion -r- Compromise or waiver 
— Recipient's right to action 
protected. 
Action or claim by recipient — 
Consent of department required 
Section 
26-19-18. 
— Department's right to inter-
vene — Department's interests 
protected — Attorney's fees and 
costs. 
Release of medical billing infor-
mation by provider restricted — 
Exception — Liability for viola-
tion. 
26-19-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Medical assistance" means any funds expended by the state under 
Chapter 18, Title 26, and under Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act. 
(2) "Property" includes the homestead and all other property, personal 
or real, in which the recipient has a legal interest. 
(3) "Provider" means a person or entity receiving compensation from 
any public medical assistance program for goods or services provided to a 
recipient. 
(4) "Recipient" means a person who has applied for or received medical 
assistance from the state; his guardian, conservator, or other personal 
representative, if he is a minor or incapacitated person; and his estate and 
survivors if he is deceased. 
(5) "Third party" means: 
(a) an individual, institution, corporation, public or private 
agency, trust, estate, insurance carrier, health maintenance organi-
zation, health service organization, preferred provider organization, 
governmental program such as Medicare, CHAMPUS, and workers' 
compensation, which may be liable to pay all or part of the medical 
costs of injury, disease, or disability of a recipient; and 
(b) a spouse or a parent who: 
(i) may be liable to pay all or part of the medical costs of a 
recipient under law or court or administrative order; or 
(ii) has been ordered to maintain health, dental, or disability 
insurance to cover medical expenses of a spouse or dependent 
child by court or administrative order. 
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26-19-5 HEALTH CODE 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-2, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
1981, ch. 126, § 18; 1984, ch. 34, § 1; 1987, ment, effective April 24,1989, rewrote Subsec-
ch. 181, § 4; 1989, ch. 163, § 1. tion (5). 
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party 
liable for payment — Lien — Notice — Action — 
Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to ac-
tion protected. 
(1) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide medical 
assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability for which a 
third party is liable, the department may recover the medical assistance di-
rectly from that third party. The department's claim to recover medical assis-
tance provided as a result of such an injury, disease, or disability shall be a 
lien against any proceeds payable to the recipient by that third party. This 
lien has priority over all other claims to the proceeds, except claims for attor-
ney's fees and costs authorized under Subsection 26-19-7(4). 
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to the 
third party at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice 
shall include the recipient's name, the approximate date of injury, a general 
description of the type of injury and, if applicable, the general location where 
the injury is alleged to have occurred. 
(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own name 
however, that lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless: 
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's lien be-
fore it settles with the recipient; or 
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge 
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical assis-
tance. 
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole or in 
part, or may compromise, settle, or-release a claim or lien. 
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a 
recipient or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the 
department's action. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-5, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 34, § 3; 1989, ch. 163, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
''When" for "If' at the beginning of Subsection 
(1) and added the second and third sentences of 
that subsection; substituted "The department" 
for "If the department has a claim for recovery 
from a third party it" and "lien" for "claim" in 
the first sentence of Subsection (2) and the lan-
guage beginning "the approximate date of in-
jury" for "last known address, identification 
number, diagnosis, date and type of service, 
and an itemized list of charges" at the end of 
the second sentence of that subsection; rewrote 
Subsection (3); substituted "a claim or lien" for 
"it" at the end of Subsection (4); and deleted 
Subsection (6), which read "A third party need 
not pay a claim for medical assistance more 
than once." 
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26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient — Consent of depart-
ment required — Department's right to intervene 
— Department's interests protected — Attorney's 
fees and costs. 
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle, 
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of 
medical costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the depart-
ment has provided or has become obligated to provide medical assistance 
without the department's written consent. 
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an ac-
tion commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected 
with the same injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or 
has become obligated to provide medical assistance. 
(2) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as 
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision, 
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the 
action. The department may recover in full from the recipient all medical 
assistance which it has provided and retains its right to commence an inde-
pendent action against the third party, subject to Subsection 26-19-5(3). 
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what 
terms the interests of the department may be represented in an action com-
menced by the recipient. 
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for 
attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action 
that is commenced with the department's written consent. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-7, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 34, § 5; 1989, ch. 163, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted 
"commence an action, or settle, compromise, 
release, or waive a claim" for "or commence an 
action" near the beginning of Subsection (l)(a);^ 
divided Subsection (2) into two sentences by 
deleting "and"; substituted "retains" for "shall 
maintain" in the present second sentence of 
Subsection (2); and substituted the language 
beginning "a proportionate share" for "its pro-
portionate share of the cost of any action com-
menced in compliance with this section" at the 
end of Subsection (4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
State consent. 
—Costs and attorney fees. 
—Proceeding against third party. 
State consent. 
—Costs and attorney fees. 
The commencement of an action without 
state consent would rule out a state contribu-
tion for costs and attorney fees. Camp v. Office 
of Recovery Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Although Subsection (4) may authorize an 
award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipi-
ents, the fees must be in connection with the 
commencement of an action, and the action 
must be commenced with the state's written 
consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery Servs., 779 
P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Proceeding against third party. 
The state is entitled to full, rather than equi-
table, reimbursement from a recipient for all 
its Medicaid expenditures when the recipient 
proceeds against a third party without the 
state's consent. Camp v. Office of Recovery 
Servs., 779 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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26-19-18. Release of medical billing information by pro-
vider restricted — Exception — Liability for vio-
lation. 
Except as provided in Section 26-21-20, a provider may not release medical 
billing information to the recipient or the recipient's representative, or to a 
third party without written authority from the department. A provider who 
violates this section is liable to the department for any loss caused as a result 
of the unauthorized disclosure. 
History: C. 1953, 26-19-18, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 34, § 10; 1989, ch. 196, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 1,1990, added "Except as 
provided in Section 26-21-20." 
CHAPTER 21 
HEALTH CARE FACILITY LICENSURE 
AND INSPECTION ACT 
Section 
26-21-1. 
26-21-2. 
26-21-2.1. 
26-21-3. 
26-21-5. 
26-21-6. 
26-21-7. 
26-21-8. 
26-21-9. 
26-21-10. 
26-21-11. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Services. 
Health Facility Committee — 
Members — Terms — Organi-
zation — Meetings. 
Powers and responsibilities of 
committee. 
Powers and responsibilities of de-
partment. 
Exempt facilities. 
License required — Not assign-
able or transferable — Posting 
— Expiration and renewal — 
Time for compliance by operat-
ing facilities. 
Application for license — Infor-
mation required — Public 
records. 
Violations — Committee review. 
Violations — Denial, suspension, 
or revocation of license — Re-
stricting or prohibiting new ad-
missions —^Monitor. 
Section 
26-21-12. 
26-21-13. 
26-21-13.5. 
26-21-14. 
26-21-15. 
26-21-16. 
26-21-17. 
26-21-18. 
26-21-20. 
Issuance of new license after revo-
cation — Suspension of license 
— Restoration. 
License issued to facility in com-
pliance or substantial compli-
ance with chapter and rules. 
Intermediate care facilities for 
the mentally retarded — Li-
censing. 
Closing facility — Appeal. 
Action by department for injunc-
tion. 
Operating facility in violation of 
chapter or rules a misde-
meanor. 
Department agency of state to 
contract for certification of fa-
cilities under Social Security 
Act. 
Repealed. 
Requirement for hospitals to pro-
vide statements of itemized 
charges to patients. 
26-21-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Health Care Facility Licensure and Inspec-
tion Act." 
History: C. 1953, 26-21-1, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 20; 1990, ch. 114, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23,1990, rewrote this sec-
tion, which had read 'This chapter shall be 
known and may be cited as the 'Health Facility 
Licensure and Inspection Act.'" 
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By. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYER #3067 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 45011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 538-4347 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
HIGLEY, AUNDRAE 
a minor. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDC 
OF STATE OF UTAH 
Case No, 853901091 
JUDGE YOUNG 
The motion of the State of Utah for summary judgment 
and the motion of the estate for summary judgment pursuant to 
Rule 56 of the U.R.C.P. having been filed and after a hearing on 
the motion and the Court having previously entered a written 
statement on the grounds for its decision as required by Rule 
52(a) U.R.C.P. and good cause appearing for the granting of the 
motion, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion for summary 
judgment of the estate be denied and that of the State of Utah be 
granted and the State of Utah, have judgment against the estate 
for the total sum being held on behalf of the minor pursuant to 
the previous order in this matter dated November 22, 1985, which 
is $20,000 plus accrued interest* 
\THE COURT: 
)avid S. 
District^Couft Judge 
Date : ^A&IUJUL^ /P • / 9 9() 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order and Memorandum Decision postage prepaid to 
the following: 
Mr. Blake S. Atkin 
Berman & O'Rorke 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
DATED this 3£*** day of January, 1990. 
^a*~y^L4A '2\Jy oUa^\^A^>^f/6^ 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
DOUGLAS W. SPRINGMEYER #3067 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor 
P.O. Box 45011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 538-4347 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) PURSUANT TO RULE 52 (a) 
HIGLEY, AUNDRAE ) 
) Case No. 853901091 
a minor. ) JUDGE YOUNG 
The motion of the State of Utah and the Estate for 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the U.R.C.P. having been 
filed and after a hearing on the motion the Court hereby enters a 
written statement on the grounds for its decision as required by 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. 
1) Recipient violated the statutory requirement that 
"a recipient may not file a claim or commence an action against 
the third party for recovery of medical costs for which the 
department has provided medical assistance without the 
department's written consent." (§ 26-19-7(1)). Accordingly, 
"the department may recover in full from the recipient all 
medical assistance which it has provided . . . " (§ 26-19-2(2)); 
^..,1. !V» 
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..swat} C.wrt: 
2) The estate previously recovered $20,000 from Robert 
J, Mott, which recovery included reimbursement for medical 
expenses in addition to $5,000 in no-fault medical benefits. 
2) The State expended over $50,000 in medicaid 
payments on behalf of Aundrae Higley for injuries related to the 
accident involving Robert J. Mott and is therefore entitled to 
full recovery to the extent of the recovery by the estate from 
Robert J. Mott, the proceeds of which are being held pursuant to 
the order of this court dated November 22, 1985, which amount is 
$20,000 plus accrued interest. 
3Y $BE COURT: 
DaVid S. 
D i s t r i c t Cqfurt 
Date : f^tMt^ £}/?$& 
